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!ird-Order !inking in Science Communication
Tom Wakeford
1. Introduction
Today, it is widely accepted in the UK and Europe that advances in science and technology are 
most likely to benefit society at large if the public has opportunities to participate in shaping 
their development1).
Reflecting this view, participatory approaches have been developed in the science 
communication field over the past fifteen years. However, for many, the promise of this 
supposed new era of citizen involvement has not yet been realised.  
To categorise the evolution of thinking about science communication, sociologist Alan 
Irwin of the Copenhagen Business School has suggested a threefold classification. In the least 
sophisticated, first-order thinking - often called the deficit model – a presumed public ignorance 
of science is blamed for any mismatch between scientific objectives and public concerns2). 
In the next stage, the more sophisticated second-order thinking, there is a general 
recognition of the need for two-way dialogue between the public, on the one hand, and 
scientists and policy makers on the other. !is approach also embraces related approaches such 
as co-operative research and co-inquiry3).
However, it is only third-order thinking that takes on board the full complexity and 
interconnectedness of the elements of knowledge being discussed, and tackles head-on issues 
such as scientific ignorance4), the reality of diverse knowledges5) and the political forces that lie 
behind science communication strategies6).
Over recent decades, thinking in Europe has changed, and sometimes changed back, 
from first-order thinking to a mixture of first-, second- and third-order thinking.  !is paper 
explores some examples of each of the three modes, and offers some suggestions for how science 
communicators could apply third-order thinking to the highly complex dilemmas that face 
humanity in the coming decade.
2. First-order thinking
!e UK’s Royal Society launched a report on the Public Understanding of Science in 1985. 
In its report ‘science’ itself is constructed as unproblematic – the result of rigorous processes 
which generate facts that are assumed to be incontrovertible and which can then form the basis 
of ‘evidence-based’ policy. If citizens do not accept or recognise these facts, then the failure in 
transmission is blamed on unreliable science journalists, ‘irrational’ public beliefs, or both.7) 
!ere was an apparent assumption of ‘public ignorance’ in matters of science and technology. 
Science itself is seen as having legitimate authority in democratic societies without the need for 
a dialogue with the public, who are merely required to be passive recipients of scientific facts. 
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!is style of science communication is an example of Irwin’s first-order thinking. In discussing 
any issue with a perceived scientific dimension, Irwin’s analysis suggests the following four 
elements of communication:
1. An authority claim is made using the language of certainty.
2. Science is presented as absolutely central to the whole issue.
3. !e best interest of all citizens is decided without involving them. 
4. Little if any account is taken of the diversity and knowledge possessed by citizens.
3. Second-order thinking
!e growing recognition that great uncertainty surrounded many of the science-related issues 
of the day – including BSE, ‘mad cow disease’ and environmental contamination in the 
wake of Chernobyl – gradually helped to foster the emergence of a new approach to science 
communication centred on ‘dialogue’ with the public8). 
Influenced by figures such as Irwin and sociologist Brian Wynne of Lancaster University, the 
UK’s House of Lords released a landmark report in 2000. It tackled the broad topic of ‘Science 
and Society’ by emphasising the ‘new mood for dialogue’ on science and technology9). It called 
for greater acknowledgement of doubt and uncertainty in scientific research and for a change 
in the culture of science communication and decision-making ‘so that it becomes normal to 
bring science and the public into dialogue about new developments at an early stage’. A new 
consensus emerged in the early 2000s which suggested that science would gain legitimate 
authority only if citizens were given a voice.
 Two dialogue methodologies - citizens’ juries and consensus conferences - have now been 
held in some 16 nations. A conservative estimate would be that there have been one thousand 
citizens’ juries in the UK alone, since the first one took place in 199410). !ese interventions 
have been inspired by the notion that groups of 14 to 16 citizens , after scrutinising evidence 
of expert witnesses of their own choice, can bring important perspectives to bear on issues 
that may at first glance appear to turn solely on technical issues – such as stem cell research, 
genetically-modified foods and a host of environmental problems11),12).
At the same time as attempts were being made to bring about dialogue-based science 
communication, social researchers including Irwin, Wynne and Michel Pimbert of the 
International Institute of Environment and Development were monitoring and analysing these 
processes of deliberative democracy13). 
!ree key questions arose:
1)    Who is in control of the issues that are discussed?
During a debate on genetically modified (GM) crops sponsored by the UK government, it 
became clear that civil servants defined the task as clear-cut decision-making on a particular 
technical issue14). For many members of the public, however, the debate was connected to 
a wider-ranging set of questions about the power of transnational companies, globalisation, 
the future of British agriculture, and the comparative benefits of GM innovation to North 
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American industry and British consumers. Members of the public thus typically framed the 
underlying issues much more broadly than did government and industry. However, the official 
framing of the GM debate – cast as simply a matter of narrowly defined risk and benefits – 
inevitably sidelined the broader range of issues introduced by citizens, where were redefined as 
attempts to introduce bias into an essentially technically-driven assessment.
2)    Who decides what constitutes a scientifically valid – and relevant - fact?
At a meeting held at the UK Houses of Parliament on 18 March 2002, Anjamma, a smallholder 
from the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, launched  a report on the possible introduction 
of GM crops to her state. She presented a personal account of a participatory process called 
Prajateerpu (from the local Telegu language – meaning ‘people’s verdict’)15). Anjamma stated 
that she and her fellow jurors had concluded that genetically modified (GM) crops would 
have little foreseeable impact on reducing malnutrition in Andhra Pradesh. The process – a 
hybrid between a citizens’ jury and scenario workshop – had, she reported, enabled the jurors 
to assess information presented by a range of scientists, based on their own cross-examination 
of fourteen experts and stakeholder representatives.  It had been facilitated in an open and 
transparent manner by a team based at the University of Hyderabad and the non-governmental 
organisation ActionAid India. 
The jurors had reviewed the evidence, including that  provided by those supporting the 
introduction of GM crops, but put forward their own evidence-based call for local self-
sufficiency and endogenous development in farming and food. 
Having observed the whole Prajateerpu process, Paul Ter Weel, a senior scientist working for 
a Netherlands Overseas Development Agency observed that: 
‘What was most interesting was the fact that farmers, on the basis of their knowledge, 
wisdom and feelings, rather quickly understood what they are dealing with. . . . What 
amazed me indeed was that they immediately knew whether what was being told to 
them was nonsense or propaganda or whether it had some meaning. And that of course 
gives hope that there is still this wisdom available amongst them to judge what is 
useful, what is genuine and what is not’16). 
Prajateerpu’s conclusions have been reflected in many other processes involving farmers 
in Africa, Latin America and other Indian states, reflecting a growing global grassroots-led 
movement for food sovereignty, based on what Irwin calls ‘citizen science’17).  It reverses the 
conventional logic of dialogue exercises involving science and technology, under which citizens 
are confined to the role of uninformed student while experts are cast exclusively as the teachers. 
In Prajateerpu, on a wide range of issues relating to agriculture, it was the so-called experts 
whose facts were challenged and the lower-caste Indian smallholders and labourers who were 
shown to have a considerable degree of expertise and the ability to apply it to new ideas.
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3)    If dialogue is about a conversation – implying that both sides will learn from it - what assurance 
do citizens have that politicians take on board citizens’ insights and priorities? 
An editorial in the UK’s Times newspaper concerning the nationwide  dialogues on GM, which 
were sponsored by the UK government, reflected a widespread perception that ‘promising 
to consult the public is the perfect way to put off making a decision or to provide cover for 
an unpopular decision that has already been made’18). Recent evidence suggests that most 
public engagement exercises, even those commissioned by UK Research Councils, are in effect 
exercises in market research, providing content for subsequent ‘public information’ campaigns 
in keeping with first-order thinking19),20). Over the subsequent years, UK citizens and some 
social researchers have questioned the lasting impact of  such a process when ‘the carnival leaves 
town’21).
A wide range of research, undertaken in an attempt to monitor public dialogue, supports 
Irwin’s conclusion that ‘the shift to second-order thinking has been partial, fixed-term and 
patchy’22). 
To move towards second-order thinking, institutions need to:
?? Review the language of authority that gives a misleading impression of certainty and of 
the inevitability of benefit from new technologies. 
?? Not only recognise uncertainty, scientific bias and shortcomings but also the validity of 
diverse perspectives. Recognise that scientific data alone is an insufficient determinant 
of decisions.
?? Take seriously the diversity and knowledge possessed by citizens who have not 
traditionally been regarded as experts
?? Take decisions only after systematic attempts to involve a range of stakeholders.
Institutions commissioning dialogue processes are often constrained by their prior commit-
ments to policies and may be effectively immune to outside influences. UK and EU policy-
makers are thus presented with a choice. !ey can retreat to first-order thinking, as they have 
on controversial issues such as nuclear power and more recently synthetic biology, reverting to 
the ‘public understanding of science’ approaches of the 1980s23). However, they can also move 
towards a third approach, which Irwin and others have begun to outline.
4. Steps towards third-order thinking
!ird-order thinking, Irwin believes, will ask ‘deeper questions, such as the relationship between 
scientific governance, political economy and innovation strategy…’  By ‘recognising the partiality 
of progress from first- to second-order thinking’, Irwin suggests that the new approach needs to 
‘raise issues that take us to the core of social and scientific ’progress’ in democratic societies’.
Such a move also necessitates a more thorough characterisation of the complex problems 
that science communication techniques are attempting to address. A classification of problem 
complexity, with consequences for how they should be tackled, has been developed in the field 
of organisational studies in recent years. It distinguishes between ‘tame’ problems at one end of 
a spectrum of complexity and so-called ‘wicked’ problems at the other24).
Robin Holt of Liverpool University has suggested that emerging risk management 
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bureaucracies have tended to mis-classify problems as ‘tame’. !is fundamental error has led 
institutions to:
?? analyse such problems within a simple hypothesis-testing paradigm, which is often 
followed by a process that gives the impression of being a two-way dialogue with 
citizens, but is largely an exercise of risk communication – transmitting information 
from technical analysts to citizens.
?? promulgate a dogmatic belief that problems are solved by specialisation and a simple 
division between ‘science’ and ‘society’, rather than embracing an holistic view 
encompassing multiple perspectives.
?? promote the belief that everyone will reach a rational consensus on what needs to be 
done on a particular issue and the right way of going about doing it, based on the 
purely technical based assessments of risks and benefits.
Yet Holt points to the growing realisation that most problems are far more complex, 
including five key aspects:
1. Problems usually have complex underlying social realities, requiring qualitative 
judgements and variable methods of mutual learning.
2. !ey emerge gradually from a variety of causal pathways.
3. Different people see the problem from divergent perspectives. !ese people may then 
set up strategies based on different mental models, potentially leading to the wrong 
problem being solved.
4. !e problems often cause a loss of orientation, including the suspicion among some of 
the diverse actors that those committed to solutions different to their own must lack 
integrity, intellect or both.
5. The problems are not amenable to solution, but can only be contained, with 
acknowledgement that action may be necessary or that new events may, if harnessed 
correctly, make the problem easier.
The immense challenges the world now faces – climate change, an ongoing HIV/AIDS 
pandemic and famines across much of the globe - are all examples of these complex, so-called 
‘wicked’ problems. Far from being an optional extra as some scientists still view it, third-order 
thinking about science communication is essential for humans to devise means of surviving 
the coming century. The fact that many of the leading organisations dealing with wicked 
problems are community-based, rather than scientific institutions, should perhaps give science 
communication professionals pause for thought25). 
The past thirty years of science communication is not a story of consistent development, 
with one way of thinking inevitably giving way to the next and then the next26). Instead, in 
most national and local contexts within the EU, these different ‘orders’ have been confused. !e 
deficit model, with its first-order thinking, has co-existed with talk of dialogue, engagement and 
co-inquiry. But a growing number of people have recently begun to reflect upon the inherent 
limitations, contextualities and conditionalities of both deficit and dialogue approaches. It will be 
vital that such efforts are deepened and broadened in the coming decade, to provide a stronger 
counterweight to those forces that continue to promote a model of science communication in 
which the only role envisaged for citizens is to applaud scientists from the sidelines.
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